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        and 
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        Union 
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       the United States House of 
       Representatives 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 
This diversity-based defamation action arises from 
statements allegedly made by a union representative about 
a company official during two separate incidents, one at a 
political rally and another at a "Town Hall meeting." The 
District Court dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint after 
finding the comments at the rally incapable of defamatory 
meaning and the Town Hall meeting comment protected 
under the doctrine of absolute testimonial immunity. 
Although for somewhat different reasons, we will affirm. 
 
I. 
 
There is a long-standing and acrimonious relationship 
between Beverly Enterprises, a national provider of nursing 
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home care, and the Service Employees International Union 
("SEIU"), whose local affiliates represent a substantial 
number of Beverly's employees. Plaintiffs are Beverly 
Enterprises and Donald L. Dotson, Beverly's Senior Vice 
President for Labor and Employment. Before joining Beverly 
Enterprises, Dotson had a prestigious career in labor 
relations, serving as Chairman of the National Labor 
Relations Board and as Assistant Secretary for Labor- 
Management Relations at the U.S. Department of Labor. 
This suit arises from two incidents in which Rosemary 
Trump, President of Local 585 of the SEIU, allegedly made 
false and defamatory statements about Dotson and Beverly. 
Plaintiffs allege that, as a result of the statements uttered 
by Trump, Dotson and Beverly have suffered damage to 
their reputations. A district court's order dismissing a 
complaint is subject to plenary review. Pension Benefit 
Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus. Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 
1997 (3d Cir. 1993). We accept as true all well-pleaded 
factual allegations in the plaintiffs' complaint and all 
reasonable inferences therefrom. Independent Enterprises v. 
Pittsburgh Water, 103 F.3d 1165, 1168 (3d Cir. 1997). The 
parties agree that Pennsylvania law governs this dispute. 
 
II. 
 
The first set of allegedly defamatory statements were 
made in August, 1996, at a political rally in Pittsburgh, 
Pennsylvania, sponsored by the Dole/Kemp presidential 
campaign. Plaintiffs allege that Trump approached Dotson 
in the midst of a large crowd, ascertained his identity as a 
Beverly official, and asked him whether he knew who she 
was. When Dotson said he did not, Trump became visibly 
upset, told Dotson he should know her, identified herself, 
and then began to berate Dotson in a loud and angry voice. 
Specifically, Trump accused Dotson of being a "criminal" 
and said that "you people at Beverly are all criminals." 
When Dotson tried to respond, Trump cut him off and 
angrily accused him of "devoting [his] entire career to 
busting unions." Despite Dotson's efforts at reasoned 
discourse, Trump continued berating Dotson, finally 
shouting at him: "I know your kind. You're just part of that 
World War II generation that danced on the graves of Jews." 
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Plaintiffs allege that these statements were false and 
defamatory as to both Dotson and Beverly Enterprises. 
Moreover, they allege that Trump uttered the statements 
with actual malice, and that, as a result of these 
statements, Dotson suffered damage to his reputation. The 
District Court concluded that each of the three statements 
at the rally were incapable of defamatory meaning because 
they constituted mere hyperbole and insulting rhetoric, all 
too common in labor disputes. 
 
We begin by addressing Trump's alleged statements 
accusing Dotson of "union-busting" and referring to Dotson 
and others at Beverly as "criminals." By statute in 
Pennsylvania, a plaintiff in a defamation action has the 
burden of proving: 
 
       (1) the defamatory character of the communication, (2) 
       its publication by the defendant, (3) its application to 
       the plaintiff; (4) the understanding by the recipient of 
       its defamatory meaning; (5) the understanding by the 
       recipient of it as intended to be applied to the plaintiff; 
       (6) special harm resulting to the plaintiff from its 
       publication, and (7) abuse of any conditional privilege. 
 
42 Pa. C. S. S 8343(a) (West 1999). 
 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that "[i]n an 
action for defamation, it is the court's duty to determine if 
the publication is capable of the defamatory meaning 
ascribed to it by the party bringing suit." MacElree v. 
Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 674 A.2d 1050, 1053 (Pa. 
1996). "A communication is defamatory if it tends so to 
harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the 
estimation of the community or deter third persons from 
associating or dealing with him." Id. at 1055 (quoting 
Thomas Merton Center v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 442 A.2d 213, 
215 (Pa. 1981)). 
 
Appellants contend that Trump's references to "criminals" 
and "union busting" were defamatory per se because they 
imputed criminal conduct to both Dotson and Beverly. 1 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Insofar as plaintiffs' allegations can be construed as alleging slander 
per se, plaintiffs are excepted from the requirement that they must also 
allege special damages. Baird v. Dun & Bradstreet, 285 A.2d 166, 171 
(Pa. 1971); Clemente v. Espinosa, 749 F. Supp. 672, 677 (E.D. Pa. 1990) 
(construing Pennsylvania law). 
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Moreover, they argue that other attendees at the 
Dole/Kemp rally within earshot could reasonably have 
interpreted Trump's statements as alleging actual facts 
about Dotson and Beverly. 
 
We disagree. Although Trump's statements were 
undoubtedly offensive and distasteful, the law of 
defamation does not extend to mere insult. Courts in 
Pennsylvania and elsewhere have long recognized a 
distinction between actionable defamation and mere 
obscenities, insults, and other verbal abuse. "[S]tatements 
which are merely annoying or embarrassing or no more 
than rhetorical hyperbole or a vigorous epithet are not 
defamatory." Kryeski v. Schott Glass Techn., Inc., 626 A.2d 
595, 601 (Pa. Super. 1993) (quoting Redding v. Carlton, 296 
A.2d 880, 881 (Pa. Super. 1972)); see also Greenbelt 
Cooperative Publishing Assoc. v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 14 
(1970) (finding that a statement that was "no more than 
rhetorical hyperbole, a vigorous epithet" was not slander). 
As the Restatement (Second) of Torts explains: 
 
       A certain amount of vulgar name-calling is frequently 
       resorted to by angry people without any real intent to 
       make a defamatory assertion, and it is properly 
       understood by reasonable listeners to amount to 
       nothing more. This is true particularly when it is 
       obvious that the speaker has lost his temper and is 
       merely giving vent to insult. Thus when, in the course 
       of an altercation, the defendant loudly and angrily calls 
       the plaintiff a bastard in the presence of others, he is 
       ordinarily not reasonably to be understood as asserting 
       the fact that the plaintiff is of illegitimate birth but only 
       to be abusing him to his face. No action for defamation 
       will lie in this case. 
 
Restatement (Second) of Torts S 566, comment e (1977). 
 
Similarly here, Trump's exclamation that "you people at 
Beverly are all criminals" is reasonably understood as a 
vigorous and hyperbolic rebuke, but not a specific 
allegation of criminal wrongdoing. Trump's accusation that 
Dotson "devot[ed] [his] entire career to busting unions" is 
equally incapable of a defamatory construction. Appellants 
describe these statements as "mean-spirited . . . 
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accusations of illegal and immoral conduct." First, it is 
doubtful at best that an accusation of "union-busting" 
amounts to an insinuation of criminal activity. Even if it 
were so understood, however, the reasonable listener would 
recognize this statement as merely a vituperative outburst 
which, although undoubtedly offensive, it is not actionable 
in defamation. On this basis, we conclude that these two 
statements are incapable of defamatory meaning and thus 
cannot support an action in tort. 
 
Plaintiffs' claim based on the third comment Trump 
allegedly made at the rally -- that Dotson was "part of that 
World War II generation that danced on the graves of Jews" 
-- fails for a different reason. As a rule, except as to 
allegations of slander per se, plaintiffs in slander actions 
must allege special damages beyond an injury to 
reputation. 42 Pa. C. S. S 8343(a)(6); Baird, 285 A.2d at 171 
("[i]t is a general rule that defamatory words are not 
actionable, absent proof of special damage"); Solosko v. 
Paxton, 119 A.2d 230, 232 (Pa. 1956) ("[g]enerally speaking, 
damages for defamatory words when spoken are not 
recoverable in the absence of proof of special damages"); 
Altoona Clay Prod. Inc., v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 246 F. 
Supp. 419, 422 (W.D. Pa. 1965), rev'd on other grounds, 
367 F.2d 625 (3d Cir. 1966) ("The Pennsylvania cases 
require both the allegation and proof of [a] specific item of 
damage to support the recovery."); Restatement (Second) of 
Torts, S 558(d). Whereas the aforementioned comments 
arguably impute criminal conduct to the plaintiff, and thus 
constitute allegations of slander per se, this accusation of 
bigotry does not fall within the narrowly defined categories 
of per se defamation. Clemente, 749 F. Supp. at 677 (citing 
the four categories of slander per se as words imputing the 
commission of a criminal offense, a loathsome disease, 
business misconduct, or serious sexual misconduct). 
 
Consequently, as to the alleged statement imputing anti- 
Semitism, to survive a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must 
go beyond a claim of injury to reputation and allege special 
damages. Typically considered as a pecuniary loss, special 
damages are "actual and concrete damages capable of being 
estimated in money, established by specific instances such 
as actual loss due to withdrawal of trade of particular 
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customers, or actual loss due to refusal of credit by specific 
persons, all expressed in figures." Altoona, 246 F. Supp. at 
422; Restatement (Second) of Torts, S 575, comment b 
(special harm is "the loss of something having economic or 
pecuniary value"). Because plaintiffs have only alleged 
damage to their reputation, they have failed to meet this 
requirement.2 
 
III. 
 
The second incident in which plaintiffs allege that Trump 
made a defamatory statement was in May, 1997, at a "Town 
Hall meeting." According to the plaintiffs' complaint, the 
SEIU persuaded several members of Congress to convene 
the meeting in the Allegheny County Courthouse to discuss 
an item of federal legislation then pending in Congress. The 
bill, entitled the "Federal Procurement and Assistance 
Integrity Act," was designed to preclude businesses that are 
in violation of certain federal labor standards from 
obtaining federal contracts. Plaintiffs allege that the "true 
purpose" of the meeting was to provide a forum for 
disparaging Beverly Enterprises and, to that end, members 
of Congress were importuned to ask speakers about the 
adverse effects that the pending legislation would have on 
Beverly. Trump, an invited speaker, allegedly made the 
following statement in response to a question from 
Congressman Klink: 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Beverly also argues that it need not allege or prove special damages 
because Trump acted with actual malice. But Beverly confuses the 
requirements of special damages and actual damages. Under 
Pennsylvania law, where a defendant acts with actual malice, there is no 
need to prove actual damages. See Frisk v. News Co., 523 A.2d 347, 354 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 
(1974)); Agriss v. Roadway Express, Inc., 483 A.2d 456, 467-68 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1985). This rule requires that, in the absence of actual 
malice, even if the plaintiff need only prove general damage to 
reputation, as in a defamation per se case, he or she cannot rely on a 
presumption of damages; he or she must offer actual specific evidence of 
such general damages. This is different from the principle of special 
damages (proof of which is excused in defamation per se cases, see 
Agriss, 483 A.2d at 468-75.) 
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       CONGRESSMAN KLINK: Thank you. To Ms. Trump and 
       Ms. Ford, just to clear up in my mind, why have we 
       seen this problem exacerbated so much in 
       Pennsylvania and we haven't seen it at the other 
       Beverly locations across the country? What transpired 
       in Pennsylvania to make the situation here much 
       worse? 
 
       MS. TRUMP: Well, this is one of the most unionized, 
       heavily unionized Beverly states, if not the most 
       unionized Beverly state. They operate approximately 42 
       facilities in Pennsylvania, 20 of which are organized 
       and we have had a history of bargaining that went very 
       well. But quite frankly when President Clinton was 
       elected and a new Chairman of the National Labor 
       Relations [Board] was appointed, the former Chairman, 
       Don Dotson, walked out of his federal government job 
       and knocked on evidently the Beverly door and said, 
       who knows more about all of your unfair labor practice 
       cases in Beverly 1 and 2 than me since I have been 
       supervising them on behalf of the government and 
       besides which, I could really -- really this is conjecture 
       on my part, but I can only assume that because they 
       went out and recruited the former general counsel for 
       the National Right to Work Committee. They decided 
       that you're the largest chain of Beverly facilities, if 
       we're able to break unionism in the Beverly chain, 
       then, of course, it will have a ripple effect in the entire 
       industry and the whole industry will operate nonunion. 
 
Plaintiffs allege that the italicized statement by Trump is 
defamatory because it accuses Dotson of criminal violation 
of the Ethics in Government Act, 18 U.S.C. #8E8E # 201 et seq. 
("EGA"). Specifically, plaintiffs allege that the "gist or sting" 
of Trump's statement is that Dotson (1) may have 
negotiated for employment with Beverly while Chairman of 
the NLRB, and (2) eventually represented Beverly in matters 
that were pending before the NLRB during his 
Chairmanship, both in criminal violation of federal 
government ethics laws. Further, plaintiffs allege that 
Trump's statement also implicates Beverly as a participant 
in a criminal conspiracy with Dotson toward these same 
ends. According to plaintiffs, these statements are false, 
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defamatory, and slanderous per se, as accusations of 
criminal conduct. On the basis of this statement, Dotson 
and Beverly claim to have sustained damage to their 
reputations. 
 
The District Court dismissed this claim after concluding 
that Trump enjoyed absolute testimonial immunity for her 
statement. Like absolute judicial immunity, the common 
law testimonial immunity provides that: 
 
       A witness is absolutely privileged to publish defamatory 
       matter as part of a legislative proceeding in which he is 
       testifying or in communications preliminary to the 
       proceeding, if the matter has some relation to the 
       proceeding. 
 
See Jennings v. Cronin, 389 A.2d 1183, 1185 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1978) (quoting and adopting S 590A of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts). After considering the scope, purpose, 
and format of the meeting, the District Court concluded 
that the meeting constituted a "legislative proceeding" for 
purposes of testimonial immunity. Moreover, because 
Trump was an invited speaker and made the allegedly 
defamatory statement in response to a question posed by a 
panel member, the District Court concluded that the 
statement was "part of " the legislative proceeding. Finding 
Trump's statement absolutely privileged, therefore, the 
Court dismissed plaintiffs' claim. 
 
We see no need to consider the contours of absolute 
testimonial immunity in this case, however, because we 
find Trump's statement at the Town Hall meeting incapable 
of either of the defamatory constructions plaintiffs allege.3 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Plaintiffs contend that the District Court erred by considering matters 
outside the pleadings without converting defendants' motion into one for 
summary judgment. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b). Specifically, plaintiffs 
contend the District Court erroneously considered a videotape of the 
meeting and a copy of the pending legislation at issue. Plaintiffs thus 
assert that "Dotson and Beverly must be provided the opportunity to 
rebut the extrinsic materials relied on by the District Court, and 
discover 
Rule 56 evidence in support of their claims." Appellant's Brief at 23. 
 
It is well-settled that in deciding a motion to dismiss, courts generally 
may consider only the allegations contained in the complaint, exhibits 
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Whether a reasonable listener could have construed 
Trump's statements as defamatory is a question of law to 
be determined by the court. Pierce v. Capital Cities 
Communications, Inc., 576 F.2d 495, 502 (3d Cir. 1978); 
Thomas Merton Ctr., 442 A.2d at 215-16; Restatement 
(Second) of Torts, S 614. 
 
Plaintiffs allege that Trump's statement implicates Dotson 
and Beverly in violation of two separate provisions of the 
Ethics in Government Act. Construing the allegations in the 
complaint in the plaintiff 's favor, as we must, we 
nonetheless find neither of these interpretations 
reasonable. First, the act prohibits an executive branch 
officer from "personally and substantially" participating in a 
quasi-judicial proceeding if the officer is also negotiating 
prospective employment with an organization that has a 
financial interest in that proceeding. See 18 U.S.C. S 208. 
Plaintiffs' complaint alleges that Trump's statement asserts 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
attached thereto, and matters of public record. Pension Benefit Guar. 
Corp. v. White Consol. Indus. Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). 
As the federal bill is a matter of public record, the District Court did 
not 
err in considering it before deciding defendants' motion to dismiss. 
 
However, the District Court's opinion also reflects the Court's reliance 
on the videotape of the meeting, which was relevant to determining 
whether the meeting constituted a "legislative proceeding." For example, 
the District Court noted the relevance of several details only obtained 
from the videotape, such as one Congressman's opening words at the 
meeting, his reference to the meeting as a "field hearing," and the 
number of other members of Congress present as well as their 
relationship to the bill. Although "a court may consider an undisputedly 
authentic document that the defendant attaches as an exhibit to a 
motion to dismiss if the plaintiff's claims are based on the document," 
such exception does not apply here. See id. This exception prevents "a 
plaintiff with a legally deficient claim [from surviving] a motion to 
dismiss 
simply by failing to attach a dispositive document on which it relied." 
Id. 
In this case, however, defendants offered the videotape (and the District 
Court considered it) in support of their affirmative defense of 
testimonial 
immunity. Because the plaintiff was not given an adequate opportunity 
for discovery or to submit rebuttal evidence, we will treat the District 
Court's decision as a 12(b)(6) dismissal and will disregard the videotape 
of the meeting in conducting our plenary review of that decision. See 
Indep. Enterprises, 103 F.3d at 1168 n.2. 
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a violation of this provision insofar as she said that "when 
President Clinton was elected and a new Chairman of the 
National Labor Relations [Board] was appointed, the former 
chairman, Don Dotson, walked out of his federal 
government job and knocked on evidently the Beverly door 
. . . ." We find this interpretation of Trump's statement 
unreasonable. Not only is there nothing in Trump's 
statement to suggest that Dotson simultaneously sought 
employment from Beverly and supervised cases involving 
Beverly, but Trump's statement suggests to us just the 
opposite: that Dotson did not approach Beverly until after 
he left his government job. 
 
Second, the Ethics in Government Act restricts former 
federal officers from representing another individual or 
entity in a matter formerly under the officer's supervision. 
See 18 U.S.C. S 207. Plaintiffs contend that Trump accused 
Dotson of violating this provision when she said,"Don 
Dotson, walked out of his federal government job and 
knocked on evidently the Beverly door and said, who knows 
more about all of your unfair labor practice cases in Beverly 
. . . than me since I have been supervising them on behalf 
of the government . . . ." Trump's statement, according to 
plaintiffs, amounts to an accusation that Dotson violated 
S 207 of the EGA "by representing Beverly in matters that 
had been pending before the NLRB during his 
Chairmanship." Again, we fail to see how a reasonable 
hearer of the statement Trump allegedly made could 
interpret it as plaintiffs suggest. 
 
Trump's statement undeniably implies that Dotson 
sought to capitalize on his knowledge of the NLRB's 
prosecutions of Beverly in an effort to obtain employment 
with Beverly. Moreover, given that Dotson was a Beverly 
Vice President at the time of the alleged statement, Trump's 
statement implies that Dotson successfully secured his job 
at Beverly on the basis of his knowledge of their ongoing 
litigation with the NLRB. However, none of these 
implications amounts to a violation of federal law-- civil or 
criminal. Trump's comment simply does not state or imply 
that Dotson has done that which the EGA prohibits: 
making, with an intent to influence, a communication to or 
appearance before any department, agency, or court in 
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connection with matters he previously supervised. See 18 
U.S.C. S 207(a)(2). 
 
Unless Trump's statement is reasonably susceptible of a 
defamatory meaning, plaintiffs have failed to state a claim 
with respect to the Town Hall meeting. See Sarkees v. 
Warner-West Corp., 37 A.2d 544, 546 (Pa. 1944) ("If the 
words are not susceptible of the meaning ascribed to them 
by the plaintiff, and do not sustain the innuendo, the case 
should not be sent to a jury."); McAndrew v. Scranton 
Republican Pub. Co., 72 A.2d 780, 783 (1950). We conclude 
that Trump's statement is incapable of conveying either of 
the defamatory meanings plaintiffs advance. Moreover, to 
the extent the statement is susceptible of another 
defamatory interpretation that does not constitute an 
accusation of criminal wrongdoing, such interpretation 
would not constitute slander per se and, as a result 
plaintiff 's complaint would be insufficient for failure to 
allege special damages. 
 
IV. 
 
Accordingly, we will affirm the order of the District Court 
dismissing the plaintiffs' complaint for failure to state a 
claim. 
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